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INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT 
The panel’s decision conflicts with binding U.S. Supreme Court preemption 
decisions, as well as precedent from this and other circuits concerning the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230.  In holding that the 
CDA did not preempt Santa Monica’s short-term rental Ordinance (“Ordinance”), 
the panel took a form-over-substance approach to preemption that provides 
localities a roadmap for circumventing the CDA.  Further, the panel’s decision 
raises issues of exceptional importance because, left undisturbed, it will 
substantially impair e-commerce throughout this Circuit—home to the world’s 
most innovative Internet companies.   
Congress adopted the CDA to “encourage the unfettered and unregulated 
development of free speech on the Internet, and to promote the development of e-
commerce” by keeping “‘government interference in the medium to a minimum.’”  
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003).  The CDA accomplishes 
these goals by providing websites like Airbnb, Inc. and HomeAway.com, Inc. 
(“Platforms”) “broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of action that would make 
[them] liable for information originating with a third-party user,’” Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007), and protecting websites 
against any duty to monitor or remove third-party content, Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 
570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009).  The CDA has played an indispensable 
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role in the rise of Internet businesses that have transformed daily lives, as well as 
countless startups that may someday do the same.  In particular, it has facilitated 
the development of online marketplaces like the Platforms, which operate websites 
where third parties can post short-term rental listings and guests can reserve listed 
properties.   
The Ordinance—and the panel decision upholding it—strike at the heart of 
the CDA and the innovation it has spurred.  The Ordinance penalizes the Platforms 
if they fail to screen third-party rental listings that are not registered and compliant 
with local law before guests “book” reservations for those listings.  The panel 
acknowledged that the practical effect of the law will be to compel the Platforms to 
“remov[e] certain [third-party] listings” from their websites; indeed, the panel 
identified no other compliance option.  Slip op. 15.  If a Platform fails to do so, it 
faces liability every time someone “books” an unregistered listing.   
Such a local requirement to police third-party listings is incompatible with 
the CDA.  It makes no difference that the Ordinance does not expressly require 
content monitoring and removal; under settled Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
preemption authority, the Ordinance’s undisputed practical effect is dispositive.   
The Court should grant rehearing or rehearing en banc for four reasons: 
 First, the panel ignored Supreme Court precedent requiring courts to 
evaluate preemption by focusing on “what the state law in fact does” rather than on 
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its formally expressed requirements.  Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 568 U.S. 627, 
637 (2013); National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 464 (2012).  This Court 
applied that reasoning when it rejected “creative” attempts to “circumvent the 
CDA’s protections” in Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016).  
As the panel acknowledged, the Ordinance will have the practical effect of making 
the Platforms remove third-party listings.  Slip op. 14-15.  Even though the CDA 
plainly forbids the City from expressly requiring the Platforms to remove listings, 
the panel allowed the City to evade CDA preemption by ignoring what the 
Ordinance in fact does and focusing on the Ordinance’s form, which technically 
penalizes the Platforms only for offering “booking” services.  The Platforms 
briefed National Meat, Wos, and Kimzey at length.  See Opening Brief at 1-3, 13, 
24-28, 40-42; Reply at 1, 7-8, 11, 18.  But the panel did not mention, much less 
follow, those decisions, and thereby created Supreme Court and intra-circuit 
conflicts.       
 Second, the panel’s decision conflicts with First and Second Circuit 
decisions holding that the CDA protects “features that are part and parcel of the 
overall design and operation of [a] website,” including the provision of payment 
services for transactions involving third-party content.  Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2016) (CDA protects website’s 
“anonymous payment” feature); Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 2019 WL 1384092, at *3 
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(2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2019) (CDA protects “design and operation” of app).  The panel 
rejected CDA protection for facially neutral website features like booking services, 
even when those features are inextricably tied to third-party content and central to 
the design of the Platforms’ websites.  The Ordinance would force the Platforms to 
redesign their websites or modify their operations, including with respect to how 
they provide booking services for listings, as well as by monitoring and removing 
unregistered listings.  This split with the First and Second Circuits provides an 
independent basis for rehearing.   
 Third, the panel’s decision creates a gaping exception to CDA immunity by 
holding that the CDA does not apply to requirements to monitor “internal” and 
“nonpublic” third-party content.  Slip op. 14.  The panel cited no authority for this 
proposition, and this holding, too, creates intra- and inter-circuit conflicts.  It 
conflicts with this Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 
853 (9th Cir. 2016), which recognized that Section 230 precludes liability for 
“failure to adequately … monitor internal communications” on websites.  
(Emphasis added.)  And it conflicts with decisions from sister circuits, which hold 
that the CDA preempts laws that require monitoring of non-public third-party 
content.  Herrick, 2019 WL 1384092, at *2 (CDA applies to “direct messages with 
other users”); Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 21.  
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Fourth, in rejecting the Platforms’ obstacle preemption arguments, the panel 
construed the CDA’s purpose as only protecting websites that filter and screen 
offensive content.  Slip op. 17.  But this Circuit has long recognized that Section 
230 also was designed “to promote the development of e-commerce.”  Batzel, 333 
F.3d at 1027.  The Ordinance is an obstacle to that purpose because, as the panel 
recognized, its ruling presents numerous online marketplaces (from the Platforms 
to eBay to TaskRabbit to startups) with the very choice the CDA was intended to 
prohibit: endure “the difficulties of complying with numerous state and local 
regulations” that compel specific types of content removal, or turn back the clock 
and adopt a Craigslist-type bulletin board model, abandoning the innovative e-
commerce services that characterize the modern Internet.  Slip op. 16, 21.  By 
embracing this massive technological regression, jeopardizing the development of 
the Internet economy, and thus thwarting one of Section 230’s central purposes, 
the panel’s decision presents a question of extraordinary importance.   
BACKGROUND 
I. Airbnb and HomeAway  
The Platforms provide online marketplaces that allow “hosts” to post listings 
advertising their homes for rental and enable guests and hosts to find each other 
online, where they can enter into direct agreements to reserve and book listings.  
ER-1836-37 ¶¶ 27–28; ER-1868-69 ¶¶ 16–18.  The Platforms unite travelers’ 
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increasing demand for overnight accommodations (often at a lower cost than a 
hotel, with the conveniences of home) with residents’ desire to earn extra income.  
Hosts alone determine whether to post listings and what content to include in them, 
and set their own prices and lengths of stay.  ER-1837 ¶¶ 30–31; ER-1869 ¶ 19.  
The Platforms inform hosts to be aware of and comply with local laws, and provide 
information about applicable regulations.  ER-1839-40 ¶¶ 39–40; ER-1869-70 
¶ 23.   
II. Santa Monica’s Regulation of the Platforms 
Santa Monica’s regulation of the Platforms began in 2015, when it passed an 
ordinance regulating short-term rentals.  That ordinance expressly targeted the 
Platforms’ publication of third-party content, prohibiting them from “facilitat[ing]” 
or “advertis[ing]” short-term rental listings that failed to comply with City laws.  
ER-24.  The Platforms sued, alleging CDA preemption.   
The City amended the original ordinance.  The amended law has the same 
effect and objective as the original: it coerces the Platforms into monitoring and 
policing third-party content on their websites.  ER-95-96.  Seeking to circumvent 
Section 230, the Ordinance refrains from overtly regulating website content.  
Instead, it requires that the Platforms “not complete any booking transaction for 
any residential property or unit unless” a listing is registered and complies with 
City law “at the time the hosting platform receives a fee for the booking 
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transaction.”  S.M. Mun. Code §§ 6.20.010(c); 6.20.050(c).  Penalties include 
imprisonment for six months and a $500 fine.  Id. § 6.20.100(a), (c).   
The Platforms amended their complaint to challenge the Ordinance. 
III. Decisions Below 
The district court rejected the Platforms’ CDA preemption claims and 
dismissed their complaints.  The panel affirmed.   
The panel first rejected the argument that the Ordinance required the 
Platforms to monitor third-party content.  In the panel’s view, “the only monitoring 
that appears necessary to comply with the Ordinance relates to incoming requests 
to complete a booking transaction—content that, while resulting from the third-
party listings, is distinct, internal, and nonpublic.”  Slip op. 14.     
The panel then rejected the Platforms’ argument that the Ordinance was 
preempted because, as a practical matter, it would compel the Platforms to remove 
certain third-party content.  As it must at the motion to dismiss stage, the panel 
“accept[ed] at face value the Platforms’ assertion that they [would] choose to 
remove noncompliant third-party listings on their website as a consequence of the 
Ordinance,” and acknowledged that was the “most practical compliance option.”  
Slip op. 14-15.  Nonetheless, it held that the CDA did not preempt the Ordinance 
because it did not technically require content removal.  Id. at 15. 
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 Finally, the panel held that the Ordinance is not obstacle preempted.  In 
doing so, the panel isolated one of Congress’s aims in passing the CDA: 
encouraging Internet companies voluntarily to filter objectionable third-party 
content.  Id. at 16-17.  Apparently concluding that this was Congress’s only goal, 
the panel ruled the Ordinance did not stand as an obstacle to that one purpose.  Id. 
at 17-18.  
REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING  
I. The Panel Decision Conflicts with Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and 
Other Circuits’ Precedent by Ignoring the Ordinance’s Practical Effect 
of Requiring Content-Removal. 
The panel erred by refusing to give any legal significance to the Ordinance’s 
overriding practical effect: requiring the Platforms to monitor and remove non-
compliant third-party listings from their websites.  “[A]ny activity that can be 
boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post 
online is perforce immune under section 230.”  Fair Hous. Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(en banc).  The panel acknowledged the CDA preempts any law requiring the 
Platforms to remove third-party content.  Slip op. 12.  The panel also accepted—as 
required at this stage—that the Platforms will “remove noncompliant third-party 
listings … as a consequence of the Ordinance.”  Slip op. 15; see ER-1848 ¶ 70; 
ER-1867 ¶ 9; ER-504 ¶ 13. 
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Nonetheless, the panel held that Section 230 does not preempt the Ordinance 
because it technically allows the Platforms to leave unregistered listings on their 
websites.  In the panel’s view, while removal of third-party listings would be the 
practical effect of the Ordinance, “[o]n its face” the Ordinance did not “mandate” 
their removal.  Slip op. 15.    
 This formalistic preemption analysis conflicts with precedent of the Supreme 
Court, this Circuit, and other circuits.  The Supreme Court has held that a “proper” 
preemption “analysis requires consideration of what the state law in fact does, not 
how the litigant might choose to describe it.”  Wos, 568 U.S. at 637.  Legislators 
may not “evade the pre-emptive force of federal law by resorting to ... description 
at odds with the statute’s intended operation and effect.”  Id. at 636.  Likewise, this 
Court has held, in the CDA context, that a party cannot use “creative” efforts to 
plead around and “circumvent the CDA’s protections,” Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1266, 
a principle equally applicable to regulatory attempts to evade Section 230.  
National Meat—which the panel did not cite, much less discuss—illustrates 
the point.  There, the Supreme Court considered whether the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act (“FMIA”) preempted a California law regulating meat sales.  The 
FMIA regulates slaughterhouse operations and preempts state laws imposing 
overlapping requirements.  California argued the FMIA did not preempt its law 
because it did not formally regulate slaughterhouse operations but, instead, 
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regulated only “the last stage of a slaughterhouse’s business,” i.e., the “sale[]” of 
meat after it left the slaughterhouse.  The Court rejected California’s argument as 
making a “mockery” of preemption, reasoning that the operation and effect of a 
sales ban would be to regulate slaughterhouse activities that were subject to FMIA 
preemption.  565 U.S. at 463-64.  “[I]f the sales ban were to avoid the FMIA’s 
preemption clause, then any State could impose any regulation on slaughterhouses 
just by framing it as a ban on the sale of meat produced in whatever way the State 
disapproved.”  Id.  The Court flatly rejected arguments that preemption analysis 
focuses on the formal requirements of the statute, rather than its practical 
consequences.  See Brief for Non-State Respondents, National Meat Ass’n v. 
Harris, 2011 WL 4590839, at *48 (Oct. 3, 2011) (arguing “[t]he focus is always on 
what conduct the state law duty directly pertains to”).   
Here, as in National Meat, the Ordinance regulates only “the last stage of the 
[Platforms’] business,” i.e., the booking transaction.  565 U.S. at 463.  But as in 
National Meat, the practical effect of the Ordinance, contrary to federal law, is to 
require the Platforms to review and remove listings or face liability.  Thus, just as 
in National Meat, federal law preempts the Ordinance.  The panel’s preemption 
analysis conflicts with the Supreme Court’s preemption framework.     
For similar reasons, the panel’s analysis conflicts with Retail Industry 
Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007), which held that the 
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) preempted a Maryland law 
requiring employers to pay the state if they did not “spend up to 8% of the total 
wages paid to employees in the State on health insurance costs.”  Id. at 184 
(citation omitted).  Although the law did not expressly regulate employee benefits, 
“[i]n effect, [employers’] only rational choice” was “to structure their ERISA 
healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum spending threshold,” and 
ERISA therefore preempted the state law.  Id. at 193; see also Metro. Taxicab Bd. 
of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 93–96, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
aff’d, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (local law preempted “if it indirectly regulates 
within a preempted field in such a way that effectively mandates a specific, 
preempted outcome”; city taxicab rules preempted because they “do not present 
viable options for Fleet Owners” to act in non-preempted manner).1 
The panel’s preemption analysis conflicts with these many authorities.  It 
wrongly focuses on what the Ordinance requires “[o]n its face,” without regard to 
its undisputed practical effect, i.e., compelling the Platforms to remove third-party 
content—the very outcome the CDA seeks to protect against.  Indeed, the panel 
admitted that “removing certain listings may be the Platforms’ most practical 
                                           
1 This Court acknowledged Fielder’s preemption framework in Golden Gate 
Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 659-61 (9th 
Cir. 2008), but found the businesses challenging the allegedly preempted law had 
“realistic alternative[s],” thus avoiding an inter-circuit conflict. 
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compliance option,” Slip op. 15, and did not identify any rational alternatives for 
compliance.  As in National Meat, “if the [booking] ban were to avoid the [CDA’s] 
preemption clause, then any State could impose any regulation on [third-party 
content] just by framing it as a ban on [transactions for] whatever [type of third-
party content] the State disapproved.”  565 U.S. at 463; see Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 
1266 (parties may not “plead around the CDA to advance the same basic argument 
that the statute plainly bars”; rejecting “artful skirting of the CDA’s safe harbor 
provision”).   
The panel decision piles conflict on top of conflict, and is incorrect as a 
matter of preemption law.  This Court should grant rehearing. 
II. The Panel’s Opinion Conflicts with Other Circuits’ Protection of 
Websites’ “Design and Operation.”  
The panel held the CDA does not preempt the Ordinance because it purports 
to regulate only booking services rather than third-party listings.  But booking 
services are integral to the Platforms’ design and operation as publishers of third-
party listings.  Consequently, the panel’s reading conflicts with First and Second 
Circuit decisions holding that the CDA preempts local laws that regulate “features 
that are part and parcel of the overall design and operation of [a] website.”  
Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 21; Herrick, 2019 WL 1384092, at *3 (same).   
In Backpage, the First Circuit rejected a party’s efforts to circumvent CDA 
immunity by predicating claims on ancillary services provided by the website.  817 
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F.3d at 20.  The plaintiffs avoided directly challenging website content, instead 
attacking design features like the “acceptance of anonymous payments” and the 
“lack of phone number verification.”  Id. at 20-21.  Although plaintiffs argued that 
claims based on those services did “not treat Backpage as a publisher or speaker of 
third-party content,” id. at 20, the First Circuit disagreed.  It held that a website’s 
“decision[s] to provide such services ... are no less publisher choices, entitled to the 
protections [of the CDA].”  Id. at 21.   
Last month, the Second Circuit adopted the same approach, rejecting claims 
ostensibly “premised on [the] design and operation of [a web platform] rather than 
on its role as a publisher of third-party content.”  Herrick, 2019 WL 1384092, at 
*3.  The plaintiff sought to hold a website liable for its alleged failure to implement 
various ancillary features or safeguards (such as a review of IP addresses or 
location verification) that would have prevented users from “impersonating” others 
by creating fake accounts.  Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018).  The Second Circuit held that Section 230 barred these claims.  
Herrick, 2019 WL 1384092, at *3. 
The panel’s decision directly conflicts with Backpage and Herrick.  Contrary 
to those decisions, the panel held that the Ordinance is not preempted—even 
though it directly targets the Platforms’ decision to “structure and operat[e]” their 
websites to provide booking services for third-party listings.  See ER-1849 ¶ 73 
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(describing how the Ordinance will compel Airbnb to “undertake a fundamental 
redesign” of its website); ER-1867 ¶ 9, ER-1873-74 ¶¶ 37-38.  For CDA purposes, 
nothing differentiates the “anonymous payment” processes the First Circuit found 
protected in Backpage from the Platforms’ booking services for third-party listings.  
Both deal with payment (without overtly addressing content), and both are integral 
to the “design and operation” of each website.  This case would have a different 
result under the law in the First and Second Circuits—a “square conflict” that 
warrants rehearing.  See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 172 n.8 
(1990); Ninth Circuit Rule 35–1 (same).   
III. The Panel’s Exclusion of “Nonpublic” and “Internal” Third-Party 
Content from CDA Protection Conflicts with Ninth Circuit and Sister 
Circuit Precedent. 
The panel agreed that the CDA preempts laws that “necessarily require an 
internet company to monitor third-party content.”  Slip op. 13; see Internet Brands, 
824 F.3d at 852-54 (CDA provides immunity from requirements to “edit, monitor, 
or remove user generated content”).  But the panel concluded that “the only 
monitoring that appears necessary in order to comply with the Ordinance relates to 
incoming requests to complete a booking transaction—content that, while resulting 
from the third-party listings, is distinct, internal, and nonpublic.”  Slip op. 14.  In so 
doing, the panel trivialized the necessary monitoring as nothing more than 
“keeping track of the city’s registry.”  Id.  The panel thus concocted a distinction 
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between laws requiring the monitoring of public-facing third-party content (which 
the CDA preempts) and laws requiring monitoring of “internal, and nonpublic” 
third-party content (which, the panel says, the CDA does not preempt).  Id. 
 That distinction has no support in the law and directly conflicts with 
decisions from this and other Circuits.  To begin with, as a practical matter, the 
Platforms must remove non-compliant listings before guests make booking 
requests—a process requiring review and monitoring of third-party content.  ER-
1848 ¶ 70; ER-1867 ¶ 9; ER-395–96 ¶¶ 21–24, ER-504 ¶ 13.  But even if the 
Platforms did not remove non-compliant listings, they still would be required to 
review hundreds of individual listings daily when fielding “incoming requests to 
complete a booking transaction”: booking requests, standing alone, could not tell 
the Platforms whether they can lawfully proceed with a booking.  Id.  Rather, after 
receiving a request, a Platform must review the listing, check its content (and its 
address) against the City’s registry, and determine whether to proceed.  Id. 
While this listing review may be “internal,” it remains a protected publisher 
function.  This Court in Internet Brands, for example, made clear that the CDA 
applies to an “alleged failure to adequately ...  monitor internal communications.”  
824 F.3d at 853 (emphasis added).  Other circuits have held that the CDA preempts 
claims based on monitoring internal content.  Herrick, 2019 WL 1384092, at *2 
(CDA applies to claims premised on users’ “direct messages”); Backpage, 817 
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F.3d at 21 (same).  Courts routinely have “applied the CDA to bar claims 
predicated” on “nonpublic [third-party content], and have done so without 
questioning whether the CDA applies in such circumstances.”  Fields v. Twitter, 
Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 
2018) (collecting authorities).    
The Ordinance requires the Platforms, before providing booking services, to 
review a third-party host’s listing and determine whether the listed property is 
registered.  This indisputably compels monitoring of third-party content, which 
even the panel acknowledged was a protected publisher function.  The panel’s 
opinion therefore creates a separate set of conflicts worthy of rehearing.       
IV. The Panel’s Obstacle Preemption Analysis Conflicts with this Circuit’s 
Longstanding Interpretation of the CDA’s Purposes. 
The Ordinance stands as an “obstacle to the accomplishment” of Congress’s 
objectives in passing Section 230.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 
U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).  In rejecting that argument, the panel recognized only one 
of several congressional purposes in passing the CDA—to encourage voluntary 
“self-monitoring of third-party content”—and found the Ordinance was no obstacle 
to that objective.  Slip op. 16.  But the panel erred in “wholly ignor[ing] other and 
equally important [c]ongressional objectives.”  Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. 
v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 143 (2002).  In particular, it ignored Congress’s equally 
important interest in promoting “the vibrant and competitive free market that 
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presently exists for the Internet ... unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  47 
U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); see Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176 (noting “robust 
development of the Internet that Congress envisioned” in enacting CDA) 
(McKeown, J., dissenting).  Likewise, it ignored Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027, where 
this Court acknowledged Congress’s intent to promote “the continued development 
of the Internet,” including “the development of e-commerce” (emphasis added).   
The panel’s incomplete understanding of Section 230’s purposes, and the 
Ordinance’s manifest impediment to achieving those purposes, requires rehearing.   
V. The Panel’s Approach Presents a Question of Exceptional Importance 
Because It Will Gravely Harm the Modern Internet Economy.  
The panel’s opinion substantially threatens e-commerce and the ongoing 
development of the Internet.  If municipalities or plaintiffs can regulate third-party 
content simply by targeting online marketplaces’ transaction processing, these 
businesses—from eBay and TaskRabbit to promising startups—will be left 
unprotected from a variety of content-related claims.  It would allow any local 
regulation or private tort claim to circumvent the CDA so long as it technically 
rests on a website’s enabling third-party transactions, even if those transactions are 
inextricably intertwined with the posting of third-party content.  The panel itself 
acknowledged its ruling would create “difficulties of complying with numerous 
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state and local regulations” for the Platforms and other online marketplaces.  Slip 
op. 16.2   
At the same time, the panel held that the CDA would continue to protect 
outmoded bulletin board websites like Craigslist, id. at 20 (“Unlike the Platforms, 
[websites like Craigslist] would not be subject to the Ordinance”), simply because 
they have not integrated e-commerce functionality into their sites.  But 
“[i]mmunity is not foreclosed simply because a website offers more than a 
‘bulletin board’ service.”  La Park La Brea A LLC v. Airbnb, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 3d 
1097, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2017).   
Thus, the panel gave the Platforms (and other marketplace websites) an 
impermissible choice: comply with potentially thousands of local laws across the 
country and at every level of government that may seek to compel content-
monitoring and removal, or turn back the clock and adopt a Craigslist-type bulletin 
board, abandoning the innovative e-commerce services that customers desire.  See 
ECF No. 23 (Brief of Amici Curiae eBay, et al.) at 8 (“Platforms that facilitate user 
                                           
2 The panel said that “the CDA does not provide internet companies with a one-
size-fits-all body of law.”  Slip op. 16.  Congress, however, intended the CDA “to 
establish a uniform national standard of content regulation,” S. Conf. Rep. 104-
230, at 191 (1996), while leaving the Platforms to comply with the many laws and 
regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses that do not control content.  
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (CDA 
treats “Internet publishers … differently from corresponding publishers in print, 
television and radio”). 
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transactions could be forced to scale back services, and potential new entrants will 
be deterred from starting new businesses.”).  By endangering the ongoing 
development of the Internet economy, the panel’s decision presents a question of 
exceptional importance.   
CONCLUSION 
Rehearing or rehearing en banc should be granted. 
DATED:  April 26, 2019 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 
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* The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for 
the District of Oregon, sitting by designation. 
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SUMMARY** 
 
  
Civil Rights 
 
 The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, for 
failure to state a claim, of a complaint brought by 
HomeAway.com and Airbnb Inc. challenging the City of 
Santa Monica’s Ordinance 2535, which imposes various 
obligations on companies that host online platforms for 
short-term vacation rentals.   
 
 The Ordinance, as amended in 2017, imposes four 
obligations on hosting platforms: (1) collecting and 
remitting Transient Occupancy Taxes; (2) regularly 
disclosing listings and booking information to the City; (3) 
refraining from booking properties not licensed and listed on 
the City’s registry; (4) and refraining from collecting a fee 
for ancillary services. 
 
 The panel rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that the 
Ordinance violated the Communications Decency Act of 
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 because it required them to monitor 
and remove third-party content, and therefore interfered with 
federal policy protecting internet companies from liability 
for posting third-party content.  The panel stated that the 
Ordinance prohibits processing transactions for unregistered 
properties.  It does not require the Platforms to review the 
content provided by the hosts of listings on their websites.  
Rather, the panel noted that the only monitoring that 
appeared necessary in order to comply with the Ordinance 
                                                                                                 
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court.  It 
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. 
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related to incoming requests to complete a booking 
transaction—content that, while resulting from the third-
party listings, was distinct, internal, and nonpublic.   The 
panel concluded that the Ordinance was not inconsistent 
with the Communications Decency Act, and therefore was 
not expressly preempted by its terms.  The panel further 
concluded that the Ordinance would not pose an obstacle to 
Congress’s aim to encourage self-monitoring of third-party 
content, and therefore obstacle preemption did not preclude 
Santa Monica from enforcing the Ordinance. 
 
 The panel held that the Ordinance did not implicate 
speech protected by the First Amendment, concluding that 
the Ordinance’s prohibitions regulate nonexpressive 
conduct, specifically booking transactions, and do not single 
out those engaged in expressive activity.  
  
 
COUNSEL 
 
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (argued) and Chad Golder, Munger, 
Tolles & Olson LLP, Washington, D.C.; Joseph W. Cotchett 
and Alexandra P. Summer, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, 
LLP, Santa Monica, California; Jonathan H. Blavin and 
Joshua Patashnik, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, San 
Francisco, California; John B. Major, Munger, Tolles & 
Olson, Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Airbnb, Inc. 
 
Stephen M. Rummage and Ambika K. Doran, Davis Wright 
Tremaine LLP, Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellant 
HomeAway.com, Inc. 
 
George S. Cardona (argued), Deputy City Attorney; Lane 
Dilg, City Attorney; Yibin Shen, Chief Deputy City 
  Case: 18-55367, 04/26/2019, ID: 11279514, DktEntry: 88, Page 30 of 66
 HOMEAWAY.COM V. CITY OF SANTA MONICA 5 
 
Attorney; Heidi Von Tongeln and  Michael R. Cobden, 
Deputy City Attorneys; Santa Monica City Attorney’s 
Office, Santa Monica, California, for Defendant-Appellee. 
 
David Salmons, Bryan Killian, and James Nelson, Morgan, 
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae 
Chris Cox and NetChoice. 
 
Catherine R. Gellis, Esq., Sausalito, California, for Amicus 
Curiae Floor64, Inc. d/b/a The Copia Institute. 
 
Ian C. Ballon and Lori Chang, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Los 
Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae Ebay Inc., Glassdoor, 
Inc., Lyft, Inc., Offerup, Inc., Taskrabbit, Inc., Thumbtack, 
Inc., Uber Technologies, Inc., and Upwork, Inc. 
 
Christi Hogin, Best Best & Krieger LLP, Manhattan Beach, 
California, for Amici Curiae League of California Cities, 
International Municipal Lawyers Association, and 
California State Association of Counties. 
 
Jeremy B. Rosen, Eric S. Boorstin, and Ryan C. Chapman, 
Horvitz & Levy LLP, Burbank, California; Michael T. 
Williams and Allison R. Mclaughlin, Wheeler Trigg 
O’Donnell LLP, Denver, Colorado; David C. Frederick, 
Brendan J. Crimmins, and Rachel P. May, Kellogg, Hansen, 
Todd, Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., for 
Amicus Curiae Apartment Investment and Management 
Company. 
 
Heidi Palutke, Sacramento, California, for Amicus Curiae 
California Apartment Association.  
 
Edward M. Schulman, Ballston Tower, Arlington, Virginia, 
for Amicus Curiae AvalonBay Communities, Inc. 
  Case: 18-55367, 04/26/2019, ID: 11279514, DktEntry: 88, Page 31 of 66
6 HOMEAWAY.COM V. CITY OF SANTA MONICA 
 
Gary S. Kessler, Kulik Gottesman Siegel & Ware LLP, 
Sherman Oaks, California, for Amicus Curiae Community 
Associations Institute. 
 
Abbey R. Stemler and Matthew C. Turk, Indiana University 
Kelley School of Business, Bloomington, Indiana; Jahan C. 
Sagafi and Relic Sun, Outten & Golden LLP, San Francisco, 
California; Peter Romer-Friedman, Outten & Golden LLP, 
Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Internet, Business, and 
Local Government Law Professors. 
 
Richard G. McCracken and Paul L. More, McCracken, 
Stemerman & Holsberry, LLP, San Francisco, California, 
for Amicus Curiae UNITE HERE International Union. 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, San Francisco City Attorney; Christine 
Van Aken, Chief of Appellate Litigation; Yvonne R. Meré, 
Chief of Complex and Affirmative Litigation; Sara J. 
Eisenberg, Deputy City Attorney; San Francisco, California 
for Amicus Curiae City and County of San Francisco.  
 
Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of 
Columbia, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae District of 
Columbia.   
 
Andre M. Davis, City Solicitor, City of Baltimore,  
Baltimore, Maryland, for Amicus Curiae Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore. 
 
Zach Klein, Columbus City Attorney, Columbus, Ohio, for 
Amicus Curiae City of Columbus. 
 
Barbara J. Parker, Oakland City Attorney; Maria Bee, 
Special Counsel; Erin Bernstein, Supervising Deputy City 
  Case: 18-55367, 04/26/2019, ID: 11279514, DktEntry: 88, Page 32 of 66
 HOMEAWAY.COM V. CITY OF SANTA MONICA 7 
 
Attorney; Oakland, California; for Amicus Curiae City of 
Oakland. 
 
Peter S. Holmes, Seattle City Attorney, Seattle, Washington, 
for Amicus Curiae City of Seattle. 
 
Jill E. Habig, Founder & President; Joanna Pearl, Legal 
Director; Oakland, California; for Amicus Curiae Public 
Rights Project, A Project of Tides Center. 
 
 
OPINION 
NGUYEN, Circuit Judge: 
Located on the coast of Southern California, the city of 
Santa Monica consists of only about eight square miles but 
serves 90,000 residents and as many as 500,000 visitors on 
weekends and holidays.  Similar to other popular tourist 
destinations, Santa Monica is struggling to manage the 
disruptions brought about by the rise of short-term rentals 
facilitated by innovative startups such as Appellants 
HomeAway.com, Inc. and Airbnb Inc. (the “Platforms”).  
Websites like those operated by the Platforms are essentially 
online marketplaces that allow “guests” seeking 
accommodations and “hosts” offering accommodations to 
connect and enter into rental agreements with one another.1  
As of February 2018, Airbnb had approximately 1,400 
listings in Santa Monica, of which about 30 percent are in 
                                                                                                 
1 The Platforms do not own, lease, or manage any of the properties 
listed on their websites, nor are they parties to the rental agreements.  
Instead, the content provided alongside the listings—such as description, 
price, and availability—are provided by the hosts.  For their services, the 
Platforms collect a fee from each successful booking.   
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the “coastal zone” covered by the California Coastal Act, 
while HomeAway.com had approximately 300 live listings 
in Santa Monica, of which approximately 40 percent are in 
the coastal zone. 
Santa Monica’s council reported that the proliferation of 
short-term rentals had negatively impacted the quality and 
character of its neighborhoods by “bringing commercial 
activity and removing residential housing stock from the 
market” at a time when California is already suffering from 
severe housing shortages.  In response, the city passed an 
ordinance regulating the short-term vacation rental market 
by authorizing licensed “home-sharing” (rentals where 
residents remain on-site with guests) but prohibiting all other 
short-term home rentals of 30 consecutive days or less. 
The Platforms filed suit, alleging that the city ordinance 
is preempted by the Communications Decency Act and 
impermissibly infringes upon their First Amendment rights.  
The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief, and 
dismissed the Platforms’ complaints for failure to state a 
claim under the Communications Decency Act and the First 
Amendment.  We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
In May 2015, Santa Monica passed its initial ordinance 
regulating the short-term vacation rental market by 
authorizing licensed “home-sharing” (rentals where 
residents remain on-site with guests) but prohibiting all other 
forms of short-term rentals for 30 consecutive days or less. 
Santa Monica Ordinance 2484 (May 12, 2015), codified as 
amended, Santa Monica Mun. Code §§ 6.20.010–6.20.100.  
The ordinance reflected the city’s housing goals of 
“preserving its housing stock and preserving the quality and 
character of its existing single and multi-family residential 
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neighborhoods.”  Id.  As originally enacted, the ordinance 
prohibited hosting platforms from acting to “undertake, 
maintain, authorize, aid, facilitate or advertise any Home-
Sharing activity” that was not authorized by the city.  
Hosting platforms also were required to collect and remit 
taxes, and to regularly disclose listings and booking 
information to the city. 
The Platforms each filed a complaint in the Central 
District of California challenging the initial ordinance, and 
the district court consolidated the cases for discovery and 
pretrial matters.  On September 21, 2016, the parties 
stipulated to stay the case while the city considered 
amendments to the local ordinance.  During the stay period, 
the district court for the Northern District of California 
denied a preliminary injunction requested by the plaintiffs in 
a separate case challenging a similar ordinance in San 
Francisco.  See Airbnb Inc. v. City & County of San 
Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  That 
case ended in a settlement in which the Platforms agreed to 
comply with an amended version of San Francisco’s 
ordinance that prohibited booking unlawful transactions but 
provided a safe harbor wherein any platform that complies 
with the responsibilities set out in the Ordinance will be 
presumed to be in compliance with the law. 
In January 2017, Santa Monica likewise amended its 
own ordinance.  The version challenged here, Ordinance 
2535 (the “Ordinance”), retains its prohibitions on most 
types of short-term rentals, with the exception of licensed 
home-shares.  In addition, the Ordinance imposes four 
obligations on hosting platforms directly: (1) collecting and 
remitting “Transient Occupancy Taxes,” (2) disclosing 
certain listing and booking information regularly, 
(3) refraining from completing any booking transaction for 
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properties not licensed and listed on the City’s registry, and 
(4) refraining from collecting or receiving a fee for 
“facilitating or providing services ancillary to a vacation 
rental or unregistered home-share.”  If a housing platform 
operates in compliance with these obligations, the Ordinance 
provides a safe harbor by presuming the platform to be in 
compliance with the law. Otherwise, violations are 
punishable by a fine of up to $500 and/or imprisonment for 
up to six months. 
After the district court lifted the stay, the Platforms 
amended their complaint to challenge the revised ordinance 
and moved for a preliminary injunction.  Santa Monica 
moved to dismiss the amended complaint.  The court denied 
the Platforms’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief and 
subsequently granted Santa Monica’s motion to dismiss on 
the ground that the Platforms failed to state a claim under 
federal law, including the Communications Decency Act of 
1996 and the First Amendment.  The district court also 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their 
remaining state-law claims.2  The Platforms timely appealed 
these decisions, and we consolidated the appeals. 
                                                                                                 
2 The Platforms do not appeal the district court’s dismissal of other 
federal claims brought under the Fourth Amendment and the Stored 
Communications Act.  Similarly, they do not challenge the court’s 
decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law 
claims under the California Coastal Act if we affirm the dismissal of their 
federal claims.  Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal, we need 
not consider the state-law claims.  We deny Santa Monica’s motion for 
judicial notice of its prior enforcement actions because the dispute as to 
its prior actions relates only to the state-law claims. 
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JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review the district court’s order of dismissal de novo, 
“accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
construing them in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.”  Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 863 
(2017) (quoting Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th 
Cir. 2016)). 
DISCUSSION 
I.  Communications Decency Act 
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA” or 
the “Act”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, provides internet companies 
with immunity from certain claims in furtherance of its 
stated policy “to promote the continued development of the 
Internet and other interactive computer services.”  Id. 
§ 230(b)(1).  Construing this immunity broadly, the 
Platforms argue that the Ordinance requires them to monitor 
and remove third-party content, and therefore violates the 
CDA by interfering with federal policy protecting internet 
companies from liability for posting third-party content.  
Santa Monica, on the other hand, argues that the Ordinance 
does not implicate the CDA because it imposes no obligation 
on the Platforms to monitor or edit any listings provided by 
hosts.  Santa Monica contends that the Ordinance is simply 
an exercise of its right to enact regulations to preserve 
housing by curtailing “incentives for landlords to evade rent 
control laws, evict tenants, and convert residential units into 
de facto hotels.” 
We begin our analysis with the text of the CDA.  See BP 
America Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006).  
Section 230(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an 
  Case: 18-55367, 04/26/2019, ID: 11279514, DktEntry: 88, Page 37 of 66
12 HOMEAWAY.COM V. CITY OF SANTA MONICA 
 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”  Id. § 230(c)(1).  The CDA 
explicitly preempts inconsistent state laws: “Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to prevent any State from 
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. 
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with 
this section.”  Id. § 230(e)(3). 
We have construed these provisions to extend immunity 
to “(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service 
(2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of 
action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided 
by another information content provider.”  Barnes v. Yahoo!, 
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009).  Only the 
second element is at issue here: whether the Ordinance treats 
the Platforms as a “publisher or speaker” in a manner that is 
barred by the CDA.  Although the CDA does not define 
“publisher,” we have defined “publication” in this context to 
“involve[] reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to 
publish or to withdraw from publication third-party 
content.”  Id. at 1102 (citing Fair Hous. Council v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 
2008) (en banc)). 
The Platforms offer two different theories as to how the 
Ordinance in fact reaches “publication” activities.  First, the 
Platforms claim that the Ordinance is expressly preempted 
by the CDA because, as they argue, it implicitly requires 
them “to monitor the content of a third-party listing and 
compare it against the City’s short-term rental registry 
before allowing any booking to proceed.”  Relying on Doe 
v. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016), the 
Platforms take the view that CDA immunity follows 
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whenever a legal duty “affects” how an internet company 
“monitors” a website. 
However, the Platforms read Internet Brands too 
broadly.  In that case, two individuals used the defendant’s 
website to message and lure the plaintiff to sham auditions 
where she was drugged and raped.  Id. at 848.  We held that, 
where the website provider was alleged to have known 
independently of the ongoing scheme beforehand, the CDA 
did not bar an action under state law for failure to warn.  Id. 
at 854.  We observed that a duty to warn would not 
“otherwise affect how [the defendant] publishes or 
monitors” user content.  Id. at 851.  Though the defendant 
did, in its business, act as a publisher of third-party content, 
the underlying legal duty at issue did not seek to hold the 
defendant liable as a “publisher or speaker” of third-party 
content.  Id. at 853; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  We therefore 
declined to extend CDA immunity to the defendant for the 
plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim.  Internet Brands, 824 F.3d 
at 854. 
We do not read Internet Brands to suggest that CDA 
immunity attaches any time a legal duty might lead a 
company to respond with monitoring or other publication 
activities.  It is not enough that third-party content is 
involved; Internet Brands rejected use of a “but-for” test that 
would provide immunity under the CDA solely because a 
cause of action would not otherwise have accrued but for the 
third-party content.  Id. at 853.  We look instead to what the 
duty at issue actually requires: specifically, whether the duty 
would necessarily require an internet company to monitor 
third-party content.  See id. at 851, 853. 
Here, the Ordinance does not require the Platforms to 
monitor third-party content and thus falls outside of the 
CDA’s immunity.  The Ordinance prohibits processing 
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transactions for unregistered properties.  It does not require 
the Platforms to review the content provided by the hosts of 
listings on their websites.  Rather, the only monitoring that 
appears necessary in order to comply with the Ordinance 
relates to incoming requests to complete a booking 
transaction—content that, while resulting from the third-
party listings, is distinct, internal, and nonpublic.  As in 
Internet Brands, it is not enough that the third-party listings 
are a “but-for” cause of such internal monitoring.  See 
824 F.3d at 853.  The text of the CDA is “clear that neither 
this subsection nor any other declares a general immunity 
from liability deriving from third-party content.”  Barnes, 
570 F.3d at 1100.  To provide broad immunity “every time a 
website uses data initially obtained from third parties would 
eviscerate [the CDA].”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100 (quoting 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc)).  That is not the result that Congress intended. 
Nor could a duty to cross-reference bookings against 
Santa Monica’s property registry give rise to CDA 
immunity.  While keeping track of the city’s registry is 
“monitoring” third-party content in the most basic sense, 
such conduct cannot be fairly classified as “publication” of 
third-party content.  The Platforms have no editorial control 
over the registry whatsoever.  As with tax regulations or 
criminal statutes, the Ordinance can fairly charge parties 
with keeping abreast of the law without running afoul of the 
CDA. 
Second, the Platforms argue that the Ordinance “in 
operation and effect . . . forces [them] to remove third-party 
content.”  Although it is clear that the Ordinance does not 
expressly mandate that they do so, the Platforms claim that 
“common sense explains” that they cannot “leave in place a 
website chock-full of un-bookable listings.”  For purposes of 
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our review, we accept at face value the Platforms’ assertion 
that they will choose to remove noncompliant third-party 
listings on their website as a consequence of the Ordinance.3  
Nonetheless, their choice to remove listings is insufficient to 
implicate the CDA. 
On its face, the Ordinance does not proscribe, mandate, 
or even discuss the content of the listings that the Platforms 
display on their websites.  See Santa Monica Mun. Code 
§§ 6.20.010–6.20.100.  It requires only that transactions 
involve licensed properties.  We acknowledge that, as the 
Platforms explain in Airbnb’s complaint and in the briefing 
on appeal, removal of these listings would be the best option 
“from a business standpoint.”  But, as in Internet Brands, the 
underlying duty “could have been satisfied without changes 
to content posted by the website’s users.”  See 824 F.3d 
at 851.  Even assuming that removing certain listings may be 
the Platforms’ most practical compliance option, allowing 
internet companies to claim CDA immunity under these 
circumstances would risk exempting them from most local 
regulations and would, as this court feared in 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164, “create a lawless no-
man’s-land on the Internet.”  We hold that the Ordinance is 
not “inconsistent” with the CDA, and is therefore not 
expressly preempted by its terms.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). 
Finally, the Platforms argue that, even if the Ordinance 
is not expressly preempted by the CDA, the Ordinance 
imposes “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
                                                                                                 
3 The Platforms argued below that the district court must accept as 
true their allegation that they would “have to” monitor and screen 
listings.  As a matter of law, the Ordinance does not require them to do 
so.  Courts are “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched 
as a factual allegation.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 
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of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  See Crosby 
v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 
(2000).  Reading the CDA expansively, they argue that the 
Ordinance conflicts with the CDA’s goal “to preserve the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for 
the Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  
See § 230(b)(2).  We have consistently eschewed an 
expansive reading of the statute that would render unlawful 
conduct “magically . . . lawful when [conducted] online,” 
and therefore “giv[ing] online businesses an unfair 
advantage over their real-world counterparts.”  See 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164, 1164–65 n.15.  For the 
same reasons, while we acknowledge the Platforms’ 
concerns about the difficulties of complying with numerous 
state and local regulations, the CDA does not provide 
internet companies with a one-size-fits-all body of law.  Like 
their brick-and-mortar counterparts, internet companies 
must also comply with any number of local regulations 
concerning, for example, employment, tax, or zoning.  
Because the Ordinance would not pose an obstacle to 
Congress’s aim to encourage self-monitoring of third-party 
content, we hold that obstacle preemption does not preclude 
Santa Monica from enforcing the Ordinance. 
Fundamentally, the parties dispute how broadly to 
construe the CDA so as to continue serving the purposes 
Congress envisioned while allowing state and local 
governments breathing room to address the pressing issues 
faced by their communities.  We have previously 
acknowledged that the CDA’s immunity reaches beyond the 
initial state court decision that sparked its enactment.  See 
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., which held an internet 
company liable for defamation when it removed some, but 
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not all, harmful content from its public message boards, 
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) 
(unpublished)).  As the Platforms correctly note, the Act’s 
policy statements broadly promote “the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet 
. . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(b)(2).  “[A] law’s scope often differs from its genesis,” 
and we have repeatedly held the scope of immunity to reach 
beyond defamation cases.  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 
Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. 
v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008), as 
amended (May 2, 2008)) (citing cases applying immunity for 
causes of action including discrimination, fraud, and 
negligence). 
At the same time, our cases have hewn closely to the 
statutory language of the CDA and have limited the 
expansion of its immunity beyond the protection Congress 
envisioned.  As we have observed, “the [relevant] section is 
titled ‘Protection for “good Samaritan” blocking and 
screening of offensive material.’”  Roommates.com, 
521 F.3d at 1163–64 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)); see also 
Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852.  Congress intended to 
“spare interactive computer services [the] grim choice” 
between voluntarily filtering content and being subject to 
liability on the one hand, and “ignoring all problematic posts 
altogether [to] escape liability.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 
at 1163–64.  In contrast, the Platforms face no liability for 
the content of the bookings; rather, any liability arises only 
from unlicensed bookings.  We do not discount the 
Platforms’ concerns about the administrative burdens of 
state and local regulations, but we nonetheless disagree that 
§ 230(c)(1) of the CDA may be read as broadly as they 
advocate, or that we may ourselves expand its provisions 
beyond what Congress initially intended. 
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In sum, neither express preemption nor obstacle 
preemption apply to the Ordinance.  We therefore affirm the 
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under the 
CDA. 
II.  First Amendment 
The Platforms also contend that the district court erred in 
dismissing their First Amendment claims.  They argue that, 
even if the plain language of the Ordinance only reaches 
“conduct,” i.e., booking unlicensed properties, the law 
effectively imposes a “content-based financial burden” on 
commercial speech and is thus subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny.  The district court concluded that the Ordinance 
“regulates conduct, not speech, and that the conduct banned 
. . . does not have such a ‘significant expressive element’ as 
to draw First Amendment protection.”  We agree. 
That the Ordinance regulates “conduct” is not alone 
dispositive.  The Supreme Court has previously applied First 
Amendment scrutiny when “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ 
elements are combined in the same course of conduct.”  See 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).  But 
“restrictions on protected expression are distinct from 
restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on 
nonexpressive conduct.”  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 
564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011).  While the former is entitled to 
protection, “the First Amendment does not prevent 
restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing 
incidental burdens on speech.”  Id. 
To determine whether the First Amendment applies, we 
must first ask the “threshold question [of] whether conduct 
with a ‘significant expressive element’ drew the legal 
remedy or the ordinance has the inevitable effect of ‘singling 
out those engaged in expressive activity.’”  Int’l Franchise 
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Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 408 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706–07 
(1986)).  A court may consider the “inevitable effect of a 
statute on its face,” as well as a statute’s “stated purpose.”  
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565.  However, absent narrow 
circumstances, a court may not conduct an inquiry into 
legislative purpose or motive beyond what is stated within 
the statute itself.  See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 n.30.  
Because the conduct at issue—completing booking 
transactions for unlawful rentals—consists only of 
nonspeech, nonexpressive conduct, we hold that the 
Ordinance does not implicate the First Amendment. 
First, the prohibitions here did not target conduct with “a 
significant expressive element.”  See Arcara, 478 U.S. 
at 706.  Our decision in International Franchise Ass’n is 
analogous.  There, the plaintiff challenged a minimum wage 
ordinance that would have accelerated the raising of the 
minimum wage to $15 per hour for franchise owners and 
other large employers.  803 F.3d at 389.  In denying a 
preliminary injunction, the district court held that the 
plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their First 
Amendment argument that the ordinance treated them 
differently based on their “speech and association” decisions 
to operate within a franchise relationship framework.  Id. at 
408–09.  We agreed, concluding that the “business 
agreement or business dealings” were not conduct with a 
“significant expressive element.”  Id. at 408.  Instead, 
“Seattle’s minimum wage ordinance [was] plainly an 
economic regulation that [did] not target speech or 
expressive conduct.”  Id. 
Similarly, here, the Ordinance is plainly a housing and 
rental regulation.  The “inevitable effect of the [Ordinance] 
on its face” is to regulate nonexpressive conduct—namely, 
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booking transactions—not speech.  See Sorrell, 564 U.S. 
at 565.  As in International Franchise Ass’n, the “business 
agreement or business dealings” associated with processing 
a booking is not conduct with a “significant expressive 
element.”  See 803 F.3d at 408 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Contrary to the Platforms’ claim, the Ordinance 
does not “require” that they monitor or screen 
advertisements.  It instead leaves them to decide how best to 
comply with the prohibition on booking unlawful 
transactions. 
Nor can the Platforms rely on the Ordinance’s “stated 
purpose” to argue that it intends to regulate speech.  The 
Ordinance itself makes clear that the City’s “central and 
significant goal . . . is preservation of its housing stock and 
preserving the quality and nature of residential 
neighborhoods.” As such, with respect to the Platforms, the 
only inevitable effect, and the stated purpose, of the 
Ordinance is to prohibit them from completing booking 
transactions for unlawful rentals. 
As for the second prong of our inquiry, whether the 
Ordinance has the effect of “singling out those engaged in 
expressive activity,” Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706–07, we 
conclude that it does not.  As the Platforms point out, 
websites like Craigslist “advertise the very same properties,” 
but do not process transactions.  Unlike the Platforms, those 
websites would not be subject to the Ordinance, 
underscoring that the Ordinance does not target websites that 
post listings, but rather companies that engage in unlawful 
booking transactions. 
Moreover, the incidental impacts on speech cited by the 
Platforms raise minimal concerns.  The Platforms argue that 
the Ordinance chills commercial speech, namely, 
advertisements for third-party rentals.  But even accepting 
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that the Platforms will need to engage in efforts to validate 
transactions before completing them, incidental burdens like 
these are not always sufficient to trigger First Amendment 
scrutiny.  See Int’l Franchise Ass’n, 803 F.3d at 408 
(“[S]ubjecting every incidental impact on speech to First 
Amendment scrutiny ‘would lead to the absurd result that 
any government action that had some conceivable speech 
inhibiting consequences . . . would require analysis under 
the First Amendment.’” (quoting Arcara, 478 U.S. at 708 
(O’Connor, J., concurring))).  Furthermore, to the extent that 
the speech chilled advertises unlawful rentals, “[a]ny First 
Amendment interest . . . is altogether absent when the 
commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on 
advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic 
activity.”  See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n 
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973). 
Finally, because the Ordinance does not implicate speech 
protected by the First Amendment, we similarly reject the 
Platforms’ argument that the Ordinance is unconstitutional 
without a scienter requirement.  In most cases, there is no 
“closed definition” on when a criminal statute must contain 
a scienter requirement.  See Morissette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952).  However, the Supreme Court has 
drawn a bright line in certain contexts, such as holding that 
the First Amendment requires statutes imposing criminal 
liability for obscenity or child pornography to contain a 
scienter requirement.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
765 (1982).  Such a requirement prevents “a severe 
limitation on the public’s access to constitutionally protected 
matter” as would result from inflexible laws criminalizing 
“bookshops and periodical stands.” Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959). 
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Here, even assuming that the Ordinance would lead the 
Platforms to voluntarily remove some advertisements for 
lawful rentals, there would not be a “severe limitation on the 
public’s access” to lawful advertisements, especially 
considering the existence of alternative channels like 
Craigslist.  Id.  Such an incidental burden is far from “a 
substantial restriction on the freedom of speech” that would 
necessitate a scienter requirement.  Id. at 150.  Otherwise, 
“[t]here is no specific constitutional inhibition against 
making the distributors of good[s] the strictest censors of 
their merchandise.”  Id. at 152. 
III.  Remaining Claims 
On appeal, the Platforms do not challenge dismissal of 
their other federal law claims “in light of the district court’s 
interpretation of the Ordinance as only requiring disclosure 
of information pursuant to requests that comply with the 
Fourth Amendment and Stored Communications Act.”  
Similarly, the parties specified that they would “not 
challenge the district court’s decision to decline 
supplemental jurisdiction if all the Platforms’ federal claims 
were properly dismissed.”  Accordingly, we need not 
consider the remaining claims. 
* * * 
Because the district court properly dismissed the 
Platforms’ complaints for failure to state a claim, we dismiss 
as moot the appeals from the denial of preliminary injunctive 
relief. 
AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part. 
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Addendum B 
Statutory Addendum 
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47 U.S.C. § 230.   
 
Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material. 
 
(a) Findings 
 
The Congress finds the following: 
 
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer 
services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary 
advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our 
citizens. 
 
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information 
that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the 
future as technology develops. 
 
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a 
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity. 
 
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to 
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation. 
 
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of 
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services. 
 
(b) Policy 
 
It is the policy of the United States— 
 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation; 
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(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user 
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and 
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; 
 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking 
and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's 
access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and 
 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and 
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer. 
 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive 
material 
 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
 
(2) Civil liability 
 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of— 
 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or 
 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information 
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to 
material described in paragraph (1).1 
 
                                                 
1 So in original.  Likely should be “subparagraph (A).” 
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(d) Obligations of interactive computer service 
 
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an 
agreement with a customer for the provision of interactive computer service and in 
a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental 
control protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are 
commercially available that may assist the customer in limiting access to material 
that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with 
access to information identifying, current providers of such protections. 
 
(e) Effect on other laws 
 
(1) No effect on criminal law 
 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement 
of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal 
criminal statute. 
 
(2) No effect on intellectual property law 
 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property. 
 
(3) State law 
 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from 
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of 
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or 
local law that is inconsistent with this section. 
 
(4) No effect on communications privacy law 
 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments 
made by such Act, or any similar State law. 
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(5) No effect on sex trafficking law 
 
Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed 
to impair or limit— 
 
(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595 of title 18, 
United States Code, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a 
violation of section 1591 of that title; 
 
(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if 
the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of 
section 1591 of title 18, United States Code; or 
 
(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if 
the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of 
section 2421A of title 18, United States Code, and promotion or 
facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the 
defendant’s promotion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted. 
 
(f) Definitions 
 
As used in this section: 
 
(1) Internet 
 
The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both 
Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks. 
 
(2) Interactive computer service 
 
The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access 
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or 
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational institutions. 
 
(3) Information content provider 
 
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
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information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service. 
 
(4) Access software provider 
 
The term “access software provider” means a provider of software 
(including client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or 
more of the following: 
 
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; 
 
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or 
 
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, 
organize, reorganize, or translate content. 
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City Council Meeting: January 24, 2017 Santa Monica, California 
ORDINANCE NUMBER 253-b (CCS) 
(City Council Series) 
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 
SANTA MONICA AMENDING AND REVISING CHAPTER 6.20 OF THE SANTA 
MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE REGULATING HOME-SHARING AND VACATION 
RENTALS 
WHEREAS, a central and significant goal for the City is preservation of its housing 
stock and preserving the quality and character of residential neighborhoods. Santa 
Monica places a high value on cohesive and active residential neighborhoods and the 
diverse population which resides therein. The City must preserve its available housing 
stock and the character and charm which result, in part, from cultural, ethnic, and 
economic diversity of its resident population as a key factor in economic growth; and 
WHEREAS, Santa Monica's natural beauty, its charming residential communities, 
its vibrant commercial quarters and its world class visitor serving amenities have drawn 
visitors from around the United States and around the world; and 
WHEREAS, there is within the City a diverse array of short term rentals for visitors, 
including, hotels, motels, bed and breakfasts, vacation rentals and home sharing, not all 
of which are lawful; and 
WHEREAS, operations of vacation rentals, where residents rent entire units to 
visitors and are not present during the visitors' stays, frequently disrupt the quietude and 
residential character of the neighborhoods and adversely impact the community; and 
1 
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WHEREAS, on May 12, 2015, the City Council adopted Ordinance Number 2484 
which preserved the City's prohibition on vacation rentals, but authorized "home-sharing," 
whereby residents host visitors in their homes for short periods of stay, for compensation, 
while the resident host remains present throughout the visitors' stay; and 
WHEREAS, home-sharing does not create the same adverse impacts as 
unsupervised vacation rentals because, among other things, the resident hosts are 
present to introduce their guests to the City's neighborhoods and regulate their guests' 
behavior; and 
WHEREAS, while the City recognizes that home-sharing activities can be 
conducted in harmony with surrounding uses, those activities must be regulated to ensure 
that the small number of home-sharers stay in safe structures and do not threaten or harm 
the public health or welfare; and 
WHEREAS, any monetary compensation paid to the resident hosts for their 
hospitality and hosting efforts rightfully belong to such hosts and existing law authorizes 
the City to collect Transient Occupancy Taxes ("TOTs") for vacation rentals and home-
sharing activities; and 
WHEREAS, existing law obligates both the hosts and rental agencies or hosting 
platforms to collect and remit TOTs to the City; and 
WHEREAS, enforcement of the City's regulations on home-sharing, and 
prohibition on vacation rentals, can be extremely difficult without the cooperation of 
internet companies which facilitate both legal and illegal short term rentals; and 
2 
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WHEREAS, to the fullest extent permitted by law, the City must be able to hold 
internet companies which profit from facilitating short-term rental transactions 
accountable for enabling illegal conduct; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council now wishes to clarify its regulations on short term 
rentals as they apply to hosting platforms which are internet companies that collect 
income by facilitating transactions between hosts and visitors in the short term rental 
marketplace; and 
WHEREAS, the City wishes to regulate the conduct of hosting platforms, but does 
not intend to regulate hosting platforms' publication or removal of content provided by 
third parties; and 
WHEREAS, the City does not intend to require hosting platforms to verify content 
provided by third parties or to ensure that short term rental hosts comply with the 
provisions of this Chapter. 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA 
DOES HEREBY ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS: 
SECTION 1. Santa Monica Municipal Code Chapter 6.20 is hereby amended to 
read as follows: 
Chapter 6.20 HOME-SHARING AND VACATION RENTALS 
6.20.010 Definitions. 
For purposes of this Chapter, the following words or phrases shall have the following 
meanings: 
3 
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(a) Home-Sharing. An activity whereby the residents host visitors in their homes, for 
compensation, for periods of thirty consecutive days or less, while at least one of the 
dwelling unit's primary residents lives on-site, in the dwelling unit, throughout the 
visitors' stay. (b) Host. Any person who is an owner, lessee, or sub-lessee of a 
residential property or unit offered for use as a vacation rental or home-share. Host also 
includes any person who offers, facilitates, or provides services to facilitate, a vacation 
rental or home-share, including but not limited to insurance, concierge services, 
catering, restaurant bookings, tours, guide services, entertainment, cleaning, property 
management, or maintenance of the residential property or unit regardless of whether 
the person is an owner, lessee, or sub-lessee of a residential property or unit offered for 
use as a vacation rental or home-share. Any person, other than an owner, lessee, or 
sub-lessee, who operates home-sharing or vacation rental activities exclusively on the 
Internet shall not be considered a Host. 
(c) Hosting Platform. A person who participates in the home-sharing or vacation 
rental business by collecting or receiving a fee, directly or indirectly through an agent or 
intermediary, for conducting a booking transaction using any medium of facilitation. 
(d) Booking Transaction. Any reservation or payment service provided by a person 
who facilitates a home-sharing or vacation rental transaction between a prospective 
transient user and a host. 
(e) Person. Any natural person, joint venture, joint stock company, partnership, 
association, club, company, corporation, business trust, or organization of any kind. 
(f) Vacation Rental. Rental of any dwelling unit, in whole or in part, within the City of 
Santa Monica, to any person(s) for exclusive transient use of thirty consecutive days or 
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less, whereby the unit is only approved for permanent residential occupancy and not 
approved for transient occupancy or home-sharing as authorized by this Chapter. 
Rental of units located within City approved hotels, motels and bed and breakfasts shall 
not be considered vacation rentals. 
6.20.020 Home-sharing authorization. 
(a) Notwithstanding any provision of this Code to the contrary, home-sharing shall 
be authorized in the City, provided that the host complies with each of the following 
requirements: 
(1) Obtains and maintains at all times a City business license authorizing home-
sharing activity. 
(2) Operates the home-sharing activity in compliance with all business license 
permit conditions, which may be imposed by the City to effectuate the purpose of this 
Chapter. 
(3) Collects and remits Transient Occupancy Tax ("TOT"), in coordination with any 
hosting platform if utilized, to the City and complies with all City TOT requirements as 
set forth in Chapter 6.68 of this Code. 
(4) Takes responsibility for and actively prevents any nuisance activities that may 
take place as a result of home-sharing activities. 
(5) Complies with all applicable laws, including all health, safety, building, fire 
protection, and rent control laws. 
(6) Complies with the regulations promulgated pursuant to this Chapter. 
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(b) All hosts and their respective properties, authorized by the City for home-sharing 
purposes pursuant to this Section, shall be listed on a registry created by the City and 
updated periodically by the City. The City shall publish the registry, and a copy shall be 
sent electronically to any person upon request. 
(c) If any provision of this Chapter conflicts with any provision of the Zoning Ordinance 
codified in Article IX of this Code, the terms of this Chapter shall prevail. 
6.20.030 Prohibitions. 
No host shall undertake, maintain, authorize, aid, facilitate or advertise any 
vacation rental activity or any home-sharing activity that does not comply with Section 
6.20.020 of this Code. 
6.20.050 Hosting platform responsibilities. 
(a) Hosting platforms shall be responsible for collecting all applicable TOTs and 
remitting the same to the City. The hosting platform shall be considered an agent of the 
host for purposes of TOT collections and remittance responsibilities as set forth in 
Chapter 6.68 of this Code. 
(b) Subject to applicable laws, Hosting platforms shall disclose to the City on a 
regular basis each home-sharing and vacation rental listing located in the City, the 
names of the persons responsible for each such listing, the address of each such listing, 
the length of stay for each such listing and the price paid for each stay. 
(c) Hosting platforms shall not complete any booking transaction for any residential 
property or unit unless it is listed on the City's registry created under section 6.20.020 
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subsection (b), at the time the hosting platform receives a fee for the booking 
transaction. 
(d) Hosting platforms shall not collect or receive a fee, directly or indirectly through 
an agent or intermediary, for facilitating or providing services ancillary to a vacation 
rental or unregistered home-share, including but not limited to insurance, concierge 
services, catering, restaurant bookings, tours, guide services, entertainment, cleaning, 
property management, or maintenance of the residential property or unit. 
(e) Safe Harbor: A Hosting Platform operating exclusively on the Internet, which 
operates in compliance with subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) above, shall be presumed 
to be in compliance with this Chapter, except that the Hosting Platform remains 
responsible for compliance with the administrative subpoena provisions of this Chapter. 
(f) The provisions of this section shall be interpreted in accordance with otherwise 
applicable state and federal law(s) and will not apply if determined by the City to be in 
violation of, or preempted by, any such law(s). 
6.20.080 Regulations. 
The City Manager or his or her designee may promulgate regulations, which may 
include, but are not limited to, permit conditions, reporting requirements, inspection 
frequencies, enforcement procedures, advertising restrictions, disclosure requirements, 
administrative subpoena procedures or insurance requirements, to implement the 
provisions of this Chapter. No person shall fail to comply with any such regulation. 
6.20.090 Fees. 
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The City Council may establish and set by resolution all fees and charges as may be 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of this Chapter. 
6.20.100 Enforcement. 
(a) Any host violating any provision of this Chapter, or hosting platform that violates 
its obligations under section 6.20.050, shall be guilty of an infraction, which shall be 
punishable by a fine not exceeding two hundred fifty dollars, or a misdemeanor, which 
shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in 
the County Jail for a period not exceeding six months or by both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating any provision of this Chapter in a criminal 
case or found to be in violation of this Chapter in a civil or administrative case brought 
by a law enforcement agency shall be ordered to reimburse the City and other 
participating law enforcement agencies their full investigative costs, pay all back TOTs, 
and remit all illegally obtained re.ntal revenue to the City so that it may be returned to the 
home-sharing visitors or used to compensate victims of illegal short term rental 
activities. 
(c) Any host who violates any provision of this Chapter, or hosting platform that 
violates its obligations under section 6.20.050, shall be subject to administrative fines 
and administrative penalties pursuant to Chapter 1.09 and Chapter 1.1 O of this Code. 
(d) Any interested person may seek an injunction or other relief to prevent or 
remedy violations of this Chapter. The prevailing party in such an action shall be entitled 
to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees. 
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(e) The City may issue and serve administrative subpoenas as necessary to obtain 
specific information regarding home-sharing and vacation rental listings located in the 
City, including but not limited to, the names of the persons responsible for each such 
listing, the address of each such listing, the length of stay for each such listing and the 
price paid for each stay, to determine whether the home-sharing and vacation rental 
listings comply with this Chapter. Any subpoena issued pursuant to this section shall not 
require the production of information sooner than 30 days from the date of service. A 
person that has been served with an administrative subpoena may seek judicial review 
during that 30 day period. 
(f) The remedies provided in this Section are not exclusive, and nothing in this 
section shall preclude the use or application of any other remedies, penalties or 
procedures established by law. 
SECTION 2. Any provision of the Santa Monica Municipal Code or appendices 
thereto inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, to the extent of such 
inconsistencies and no further, is hereby repealed or modified to that extent necessary 
to effect the provisions of this Ordinance. 
SECTION 3. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase of this 
Ordinance is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by a decision of any 
court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity of the 
remaining portions of this Ordinance. The City Council hereby declares that it would 
have passed this Ordinance and each and every section, subsection, sentence, clause, 
or phrase not declared invalid or unconstitutional without regard to whether any portion 
of the ordinance would be subsequently declared invalid or unconstitutional. 
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SECTION 4. The Mayor shall sign and the City Clerk shall attest to the passage 
of this Ordinance. The City Clerk shall cause the same to be published once in the 
official newspaper within 15 days after its adoption. This Ordinance shall become 
effective 30 days from its adoption. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
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Approved and adopted this 24th day of January, 2017. 
Ted Winterer, Mayor 
State of California ) 
County of Los Angeles ) ss. 
City of Santa Monica ) 
I, Denise Anderson-Warren, City Clerk of the City of Santa Monica, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing Ordinance No. 2535 (CCS) had its introduction 
on January 10, 2017, and was adopted at the Santa Monica City Council meeting 
held on January 24, 2017, by the following vote: 
AYES: Councilmembers McKeown, O'Connor, O'Day, Vazquez; 
Mayor Pro Tern Davis, Mayor Winterer 
NOES: None 
ABSENT: Councilmember Himmelrich 
ATTEST: 
2/):oj l'i 
Denise Anderson-Warren, City Clerk Date 
A summary of Ordinance No. 2535 (CCS) was duly published pursuant to 
California Government Code Section 40806. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 I hereby certify that on April 26, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing 
document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. 
 I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and 
that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system. 
   
April 26, 2019     /s/ Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. 
      Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. 
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